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ABSTRACT
One of the most striking portfolio puzzles is the “disposition effect”: the tendency of individuals to
sell stocks in their portfolios that have risen in value since purchase, rather than fallen in value.
Perhaps the most prominent explanation for this puzzle is based on prospect theory. Despite its
prominence, this explanation has received little formal scrutiny. We take up this task, and analyze
the trading behavior of investors with prospect theory preferences. We find that, at least for the
simplest implementation of prospect theory, the link between these preferences and the disposition
effect is not as obvious as previously thought: in some cases, prospect theory does indeed predict a
disposition effect, but in others, it predicts the opposite. We provide intuition for these results, and
identify the conditions under which the disposition effect holds or fails. We also discuss the
implications of our results for other disposition-type effects that have been documented in settings
such as the housing market, futures trading, and executive stock options.
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One of the most robust facts about the trading of individual investors is the so-called “dis-
position eﬀect”: the ﬁnding that, when an individual investor sells a stock in her portfolio,
she has a greater propensity to sell a stock that has gone up in value since purchase, than
one that has gone down.
Robust though the disposition eﬀect is, its cause remains unclear. Why do individual
investors prefer to sell stocks trading at a paper gain rather than those trading at a paper
loss? In a careful study of the disposition eﬀect, Odean (1998) shows that many of the most
obvious potential explanations are inconsistent with the evidence. Take, for example, the
most obvious hypothesis of all, the “information” hypothesis: individual investors sell stocks
with paper gains because they have private information that these stocks will subsequently
do poorly; and they hold on to stocks with paper losses because they think that these
stocks will rebound. The problem with this story, as Odean (1998) points out, is that the
subsequent return of the prior winners people sell, is, on average, higher than the subsequent
return of the prior losers they hold on to. Odean (1998) goes on to show that other standard
hypotheses based on taxes, rebalancing, or transaction costs also fail to capture important
features of the data.
In light of the diﬃculties faced by these standard theories, an alternative hypothesis
based on prospect theory has gained favor. Prospect theory, a prominent theory of decision-
making under risk proposed by Kahneman and Tversky (1979) and reﬁned in Tversky and
Kahneman (1992), posits that people evaluate gambles by thinking about gains and losses,
not ﬁnal wealth levels; and that they process these gains and losses using a value function
that is concave in the region of gains and convex in the region of losses, like that in Figure
1. This functional form captures the experimental ﬁnding that people, on the one hand, are
risk averse over gains – they prefer a certain $100 to a 50:50 bet to win $0 or $200 – but, on
the other hand, are risk-seeking over losses: they prefer a 50:50 bet to lose $0 or $200 to a
certain loss of $100. The value function is also kinked at the origin, a feature known as loss
aversion. This captures a greater sensitivity to losses – even small losses – than to gains of
the same magnitude: a 50:50 bet to win $110 or lose $100, for example, is typically rejected.
Prospect theory appears to oﬀer a simple way of understanding the disposition eﬀect. If
an individual investor is risk averse over gains, she should be inclined to sell a stock that
is trading at a gain, in other words, a stock that has risen since purchase; and if she is
risk-seeking over losses, she should be inclined to hold on to a stock that is trading at a
loss. Researchers have been linking prospect theory and the disposition eﬀect in this way for
over 20 years. A review of the literature suggests that the prospect theory view has proved
compelling; it is certainly the most commonly mentioned explanation for this particular
pattern of trading.
2When researchers make a link between prospect theory and the disposition eﬀect, they
typically do so using an informal argument. To be sure that prospect theory really does
predict a disposition eﬀect, and therefore that it is a valid hypothesis for further study, some
formal modelling is needed. To date, there has been very little such work.
In this paper, we take up this task, and present a simple but rigorous model of trading
behavior for an investor with prospect theory preferences. Speciﬁcally, we consider an in-
vestor who, at the beginning of the year, buys shares of a stock. Over the course of the year,
she trades the stock, and, at the end of the year, receives prospect theory utility based on
her trading proﬁt. The year is divided into T ≥ 2 trading periods. We use the prospect
theory value function proposed by Tversky and Kahneman (1992). For much of the analysis,
we also use the preference parameters these authors estimate from experimental data.
For any T, we obtain an analytical solution for the investor’s optimal trading strategy.
This allows us to simulate artiﬁcial data on how prospect theory investors would trade over
time, and to check, using Odean’s (1998) methodology, whether prospect theory predicts a
disposition eﬀect. We pay particular attention to how the results depend on the expected
stock return µ and the number of trading periods T.
Our analysis leads to two main ﬁndings. First, for some values of µ and T , prospect
theory does indeed predict a disposition eﬀect. As such, our model oﬀers a formalization
of the intuitive arguments that have been used in the past to link prospect theory and the
disposition eﬀect. Our second result is more surprising. We ﬁnd that for other, equally
reasonable values of µ and T, the standard intuition breaks down, and prospect theory
predicts the opposite of the disposition eﬀect: that investors will be more inclined to sell
stocks with prior losses than stocks with prior gains.
We demonstrate this last result in detail in Section 3. The basic idea, however, can
be illustrated with a two-period example. In the two-period case, and for the preference
parameters estimated by Tversky and Kahneman (1992), our implementation of prospect
theory always predicts the opposite of the disposition eﬀect, whatever the expected stock
return µ.
To see the intuition, suppose that a prospect theory investor buys a share of a stock for
$50. Since the investor is loss averse, the fact that she bought the stock at all means that it
must have a high expected return: that, for example, it will go up by $10 or fall by $5 each
period, with equal chance.
Suppose that, over the ﬁrst period, the stock rises $10 to $60. Our analysis shows that
the investor will now take a position in the stock such that, even if the stock does poorly
in the next period, she will still just about break even. In other words, she will now hold
approximately two shares of the stock, because even if the stock falls $5 to $55, she will still
3break even overall:
$10 + 2($55 − $60) = $0. (1)
The intuition behind this strategy is that, based on the estimates of Tversky and Kahneman
(1992), the prospect theory value function is only mildly concave over gains. The investor is
therefore almost risk-neutral in this region, and is willing to risk the loss of her initial gain.
Now suppose that, over the ﬁrst period, the stock falls $5 to $45. Our analysis shows
that the investor will now take a position in the stock such that, if the stock does well in
the next period, she will again just about break even. In other words, she will now hold
approximately 0.5 shares of the stock, because if the stock rises $10 to $55, she will indeed
break even:
−$5 + 0.5($55 − $45) = 0. (2)
The intuition behind this strategy is that, since the prospect theory value function is convex
over losses, the investor is willing to gamble just enough to give herself a chance of making
back her initial loss.
This simple example illustrates the mechanism driving the result that we demonstrate
more rigorously in Section 3: that, in its simplest implementation, prospect theory often
predicts the opposite of the disposition eﬀect. After an initial gain, the investor increases
her allocation to two shares; after a loss, she reduces her allocation to 0.5 shares. She
therefore sells after a loss rather than after a gain. The pitfall in the traditional argument
linking prospect theory to the disposition eﬀect is that it does not take into account the
investor’s initial buying decision. As soon as we do, we realize that the expected return on
the stock must be high, and hence that the size of the initial gain ($10) must exceed the size
of the initial loss ($5). It therefore takes a larger share allocation to break even after a gain
(equation (1)) than it does to break even after a loss (equation (2)).
Our results are relevant not only for the trading of individual investors in the stock
market, but also for the disposition-type eﬀects that have been documented in settings as
varied as the housing market, futures trading, and executive stock options; as well as for the
recent evidence linking the disposition eﬀect to momentum and post-earnings announcement
drift in stock returns. All of these ﬁndings have been linked to prospect theory. In light
of our results, however, we may need to go back and check that the links can be formally
justiﬁed.
The conclusion we draw from our analysis is that, for one, simple implementation of
prospect theory, the connection between these preferences and the disposition eﬀect is not
as obvious as previously thought. At the same time, we are keen to emphasize that this
implementation can, sometimes, generate a disposition eﬀect. As such, it may turn out to
be the right way of thinking about this particular pattern of trading. To determine this,
future research could test some of the new predictions, discussed in Section 3, that come out
4of our model. If these predictions are not borne out in the data, we can turn our attention
to other models of the disposition eﬀect, including, for example, other implementations of
prospect theory.
In Section 2, we review the disposition eﬀect, prospect theory, and the argument that
has been used to link the two. In Section 3, we analyze the trading behavior of an investor
with prospect theory preferences, and use our model to see if prospect theory generates a
disposition eﬀect. In Section 4, we discuss the robustness of our results and their implications
for a number of recent empirical ﬁndings. Section 5 concludes.
2 The Disposition Eﬀect: Evidence and Interpretation
Odean (1998) analyzes the trading activity, from 1987 to 1993, of 10,000 households with
accounts at a large discount brokerage ﬁrm. He ﬁnds that, when an investor in his sample
sells shares, she prefers to sell shares of a stock that has risen in value since purchase than of
one that has fallen in value. Speciﬁcally, for any day on which an investor in the sample sells
shares of a stock, a “realized gain” is counted if the stock price exceeds the average price
at which the shares were purchased, and a “realized loss” is counted otherwise. For every
stock in the investor’s portfolio on that day that is not sold, a “paper gain” is counted if
the stock price exceeds the average price at which the shares were purchased, and a “paper
loss” is counted otherwise. From the total number of realized gains and paper gains across
all accounts over the entire sample, the ratio PGR is computed:
PGR =
no. of realized gains
no. of realized gains + no. of paper gains
. (3)
In words, PGR (“Proportion of Gains Realized”) computes the number of gains that were
realized as a fraction of the total number of gains that could have been realized. A similar
ratio,
PLR =
no. of realized losses
no. of realized losses + no. of paper losses
, (4)
is computed for losses. The disposition eﬀect is the empirical fact that PGR is signiﬁcantly
greater than PLR. Odean (1998) reports PGR = 0.148 and PLR = 0.098.
Robust though this eﬀect is, its cause remains unclear. Many of the most obvious poten-
tial explanations fail to capture important features of the data. Perhaps the most obvious
hypothesis of all is the information hypothesis: investors sell stocks with paper gains because
they have private information that these stocks will subsequently do poorly, and they hold
on to stocks with paper losses because they have private information that these stocks will
rebound. This hypothesis is refuted, however, by Odean’s (1998) ﬁnding that the average
5return of prior winners that investors sell is 3.4% higher, over the next year, than the average
return of the prior losers they hold on to.
Tax considerations also fail to shed light on the disposition eﬀect: such considerations
predict a greater inclination to sell stocks with paper losses because the losses thus realized
can be used to oﬀset taxable gains in other assets.1
Odean (1998) also casts doubt on the hypothesis that the disposition eﬀect is nothing
more than portfolio rebalancing. He does so by showing that the disposition eﬀect remains
strong even when the sample is restricted to sales of investors’ entire holdings of a stock. If
rebalancing occurs at all, it is more likely to manifest itself as a partial reduction of a stock
position that has risen in value, rather than as a sale of the entire position.
Finally, Odean (1998) ﬁnds little evidence for the idea that investors refrain from selling
past losers because these stocks, by virtue of having fallen in value, often trade at low prices,
where transaction costs can be higher. Speciﬁcally, he shows that PGR continues to exceed
PLR even when the sample is restricted to stocks whose prices exceed $10 per share, a range
for which diﬀerences in transaction costs between prior winners and losers are small.
Given the diﬃculties faced by these standard hypotheses, two alternative explanations
have been proposed. One is that, for some reason, individual investors have an irrational
belief in mean-reversion: even though the prior winners they sell subsequently outperform
the prior losers they hold on to, investors think that the prior winners will underperform
and that the prior losers will outperform.
The other non-standard explanation is based on Kahneman and Tversky’s (1979) prospect
theory, a leading theory of decision-making under risk. Before discussing this explanation in




to be read as “get x with probability p and y with probability q, independent of other risks,”
where x ≤ 0 ≤ y or y ≤ 0 ≤ x,a n dw h e r ep + q = 1. In the expected utility framework, an
agent with utility function U(·) evaluates this risk by computing
pU(W + x)+qU(W + y), (5)
1Odean (1998) ﬁnds that in one month of the year, December, PLR exceeds PGR. This suggests that tax
factors play a larger role as the deadline for realizing losses approaches.
6where W is her current wealth. In the framework of prospect theory, the agent assigns the
gamble the value
π(p)v(x)+π(q)v(y), (6)
where v(·)a n dπ(·) are known as the value function and the probability weighting function,
respectively. These functions satisfy v(0) = 0, π(0) = 0, and π(1) = 1.
There are four important diﬀerences between (5) and (6). First, the carriers of value in
prospect theory are gains and losses, not ﬁnal wealth levels: the argument of v(·)i n( 6 )i sx,
not W + x. This is motivated in part by experimental evidence, but is also consistent with
the way in which our perceptual apparatus is more attuned to a change in the level of an
attribute – brightness, loudness, or temperature, say – than to the level itself.
Second, the value function v(·) is concave over gains, but convex over losses. Kahneman










over a certain loss of $500. In short, people are risk averse over moderate-probability gains,
but risk-seeking over moderate-probability losses.
Third, the value function has a kink at the origin, so that the agent is more sensitive to
losses – even small losses – than to gains of the same magnitude. This element of prospect
theory is known as loss aversion. Kahneman and Tversky (1979) infer the kink from the








Such aversion is hard to explain with diﬀerentiable utility functions, whether expected utility
or non-expected utility, because the very high local risk aversion required to do so typically
predicts implausibly high aversion to large-scale gambles (Epstein and Zin, 1990; Rabin,
2000; Barberis, Huang, and Thaler, 2006).
Finally, under prospect theory, the agent does not use objective probabilities when eval-
uating a gamble, but rather, transformed probabilities obtained from objective probabilities
via the probability weighting function π(·). The primary eﬀect of this function is to over-
weight low probabilities, a feature that parsimoniously captures the simultaneous demand
many individuals have for both lotteries and insurance.
2We abbreviate (x,p;0,q)t o( x,p).








For 0 <α<1a n dλ>1, this function is indeed concave over gains and convex over losses,
and does indeed exhibit a greater sensitivity to losses than to gains. Using experimental
data, Tversky and Kahneman (1992) estimate α =0 .88 and λ =2 .25. Figure 1 plots the
function in (8) for these parameter values. An α of 0.88 means that the value function is only
mildly concave over gains and only mildly convex over losses, while a λ of 2.25 makes the
agent substantially more sensitive to losses than to gains. This will turn out to be important
in what follows.3
2.2 Prospect theory and the disposition eﬀect
Over the past 20 years, many papers have drawn a connection between prospect theory and
the disposition eﬀect. Shefrin and Statman (1985) was the ﬁrst paper to do so; Weber and
Camerer (1998), Odean (1998), and Grinblatt and Han (2005) are just a few of the articles
that followed. Most of the time, the link between prospect theory and the disposition eﬀect
is described in informal terms. The argument varies slightly from paper to paper, but the
essence is always the same: A stock that has risen in value since purchase brings the investor
into the concave, risk averse, “gain” region of the value function in Figure 1. A stock that
has fallen in value since purchase brings the investor into the convex, risk-seeking, “loss”
region of the value function. As a result, the agent is more willing to take risk on a stock
trading at a paper loss, than on one trading at a paper gain. She will therefore be more
inclined to sell the latter.
The prospect theory view of the disposition eﬀect has proved compelling: it is the most
commonly mentioned explanation for this pattern of trading. To be sure that prospect
theory really does predict a disposition eﬀect, and therefore that it is a valid hypothesis for
further study, some formal modelling is needed. In Section 3, we take up this task, and
present a simple but rigorous model of trading behavior for an investor with prospect theory
preferences.
3Strictly speaking, the value function in equation (8) does not have a kink at the origin: v (x) →∞as
x → 0 from above or below. However, for λ>1, it does satisfy v(x) < −v(−x)f o rx>0. In this sense, it
makes the agent more sensitive to losses than to gains, and explains the rejection of bets like that in (7).
83 The Trading Behavior of Agents with Prospect The-
ory Preferences
We consider a portfolio choice setting with T +1dates,t =0 ,1,...,T. There are two assets:
a risk-free asset which earns a gross return of Rf each period, and a risky asset, which we
think of as an individual stock. The price of the stock at time t is Pt. Its gross return from
t to t +1 ,Rt,t+1, is distributed according to:
Rt,t+1 =
 
Ru >R f with probability π
Rd <R f with probability 1 − π
, i.i.d. across periods, (9)
so that the stock price evolves along a binomial tree. We assume
πRu +( 1− π)Rd >R f, (10)
so that the expected stock return exceeds the risk-free rate.
We study the trading behavior of an investor with prospect theory preferences, who, in
particular, uses the value function v(·) in equation (8). The argument of v(·) is the investor’s
“gain” or “loss”. Prospect theory does not specify exactly what the gain or loss should be.
In our context, the simplest approach is to deﬁne the gain or loss as the proﬁt from trading
the stock over the interval from 0 to T;i ns y m b o l s ,a s
∆WT ≡ WT − W0, (11)
where Wt is the investor’s wealth at time t. In this paper, we work with a slightly adjusted
version of (11), namely
∆WT = WT − W0R
T
f , (12)
so that the investor deﬁnes her gain or loss as her trading proﬁt over the interval from 0
to T, relative to the proﬁt she could have earned by investing in the risk-free asset. This
deﬁnition is more tractable, and may also be more plausible: the investor may only consider
her trading a success if it earns her more than just the compounded risk-free return. We
refer to W0RT
f as the “reference” level of wealth, so that the gain or loss is ﬁnal wealth minus
this reference wealth level.4
For simplicity, we ignore probability weighting, so that the investor uses objective, rather
than transformed, probabilities. The primary eﬀect of probability weighting is to overweight
low probabilities; it therefore has its biggest impact on skewed securities, which deliver a very
4Researchers have not, as yet, been able to pinpoint exactly which reference levels people use in practice.
We therefore choose a reference level – initial wealth scaled up by the risk-free rate – that is simple and
tractable, and that can serve as a benchmark for future analysis.
9good or very bad outcome with low probability. Since most stocks are not highly skewed, we
focus mainly on values of π close to 0.5, where probability weighting has a negligible eﬀect.5
At each date from t =0t ot = T − 1, the investor must decide how to split her wealth
between the risk-free asset and the risky asset. If xt is the number of shares of the risky
asset she holds at time t, her decision problem is
max
x0,x1,...,xT−1
E[v(∆WT)] = E[v(WT − W0R
T
f )], (13)
where v(·) is deﬁned in equation (8), subject to the budget constraint
Wt =( Wt−1 − xt−1Pt−1)Rf + xt−1Pt−1Rt−1,t
= Wt−1Rf + xt−1Pt−1(Rt−1,t − Rf), t =1 ,...,T, (14)
and a non-negativity of wealth constraint
WT ≥ 0. (15)
By taking the investor’s gain or loss to be the proﬁt earned from trading an individual
stock, we are following the informal arguments that have been used in the literature to link
prospect theory with the disposition eﬀect. This assumption means that the investor engages
in what is sometimes called “narrow framing” or “mental accounting,” in other words, that
she gets utility directly from the outcome of her investment in a single stock, even if this is
just one of many stocks in her overall portfolio. While this is not a standard assumption
in ﬁnance models, we do not take a stand on its plausibility here. Our goal is simply to
investigate whether, as has been suggested using informal arguments, prospect theory in
combination with narrow framing predicts a disposition eﬀect.6
When we parameterize our model in Section 3.1, we take the interval from 0 to T to be
one year. An informal summary of our framework is therefore that, at the start of the year,
time 0, the investor buys some shares of a stock, and then trades the stock over the course
of the year. At the end of the year, time T, she receives prospect theory utility deﬁned over
her trading proﬁt.
An alternative approach is to posit that the investor receives utility whenever she sells
shares of the stock. If she sells shares at time t<T , say, she receives a jolt of utility at
time t based on the size of the realized gain or loss: positive utility if a gain is realized, and
negative otherwise. This approach is more radical than the one we study here, in that it
5At the risk of causing confusion, we have used the notation π(·) for the probability weighting function
that forms part of prospect theory; and π for the probability of a good stock return. The function π(·) will
not appear again in the paper; the variable π will.
6Since we do think of the risky asset as an individual stock, initial wealth W0 is best interpreted as the
maximum amount the investor is willing to lose from trading the stock.
10appeals not only to prospect theory, but also to a distinction between realized and paper
gains, a distinction that ﬁnance models do not normally make.
We think that, methodologically, it makes sense to ﬁrst study the model with the fewer
deviations from the traditional framework, in other words, the model in (13)-(15). If it turns
out that this model does predict a disposition eﬀect, we will learn that there is no need to
appeal to utility from realized gains in order to understand this pattern of trading. If the
model in (13)-(15) turns out not to predict a disposition eﬀect, we will then have license to
move on and investigate the more radical model.7
We now present two approaches to solving the problem in (13)-(15). Naturally, the two
approaches lead to the same optimal allocations xt. The reason we present both is that each
has important advantages. First, in Section 3.1, we present an approach due to Cox and
Huang (1989) whereby, when markets are complete, the dynamic problem in (13)-(15) can
be rewritten as a simpler static problem. This approach is very powerful: for any number
of trading periods, it gives a fully analytical solution for the investor’s trading strategy.
Its drawback is that it does not oﬀer much intuition for why the results turn out the way
they do. In Section 3.2, we therefore present an alternative approach, based on standard
dynamic programming techniques. This approach becomes computationally intractable as
the number of time periods grows, but it provides a great deal of intuition.
3.1 A complete markets approach
Cox and Huang (1989) demonstrate that, when markets are complete, an investor’s dynamic
optimization problem can be rewritten as a static problem in which the investor directly
chooses her wealth in the diﬀerent possible states at the ﬁnal date. An optimal trading
strategy is one which generates these optimal wealth allocations. In a complete market, such
a trading strategy always exists.
To implement this technique in our context, some notation will be helpful. In our model,
the price of the risky asset evolves along a binomial tree. At date t,t h e r ea r et+ 1 nodes in
the tree, j =1 ,2,···,t+1 ,w h e r ej = 1 corresponds to the highest node in the tree at that





We denote the investor’s optimal share allocation in node j at time t as xt,j;t h eo p t i m a l
7Since the earlier papers linking prospect theory and the disposition eﬀect typically use informal argu-
ments to make the link, they often fail to specify exactly how the “gains” and “losses” of prospect theory
should be deﬁned. As a result, it is sometimes hard to tell which of the two models they have in mind. A
close reading of these earlier papers suggests that about half implicitly have the model in (13)-(15) in mind,
while the remainder are implicitly appealing to utility from realized gains and losses.
11wealth in that node as Wt,j; and the ex-ante probability of reaching that node as πt,j,s ot h a t
t+1  
j=1
πt,j = 1. (16)
If pt,j is the time 0 price of a contingent claim that pays $1 if the stock price reaches node j
at time t, the state price density for that node is
qt,j = pt,j/πt,j. (17)






With this notation in hand, we apply Cox and Huang’s (1989) insight and rewrite the








subject to the budget constraint
T+1  
j=1
πT,jqT,jWT,j = W0 (20)
and a non-negativity of wealth constraint
WT,j ≥ 0, j =1 ,...,T+ 1. (21)
This static problem can be solved using Lagrange multiplier techniques. We summarize
the solution in Proposition 1. For simplicity, the proposition assumes π = 1
2,s ot h a t ,i ne a c h
period, a good stock return and a poor stock return are equally likely. In the proof of the
proposition, we show that, under this assumption, the ex-ante probability of reaching node
j at time t, πt,j,i sg i v e nb y
πt,j =
t!2−t
(t − j +1 ) ! ( j − 1)!
, 0 ≤ t ≤ T, 1 ≤ j ≤ t + 1; (22)














12so that the state price density increases as we go down the t + 1 nodes at date t.
Proposition 1. For π =
1
2, the optimal wealth allocations Wt,j and optimal share holdings
of the risky asset xt,j can be obtained as follows. Let
V
























and let k∗ be the k {1,...,T} at which the maximum in (25) is attained.
Then, the optimal wealth allocation WT,j in node j at ﬁnal date T is given by
WT,j =
⎧
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨
















if j ≤ k∗
0i f j>k ∗
(26)
if V ∗ > 0;a n db y
WT,j = W0R
T
f , j =1 ,...,T+1 , (27)












, 0 ≤ t ≤ T, 1 ≤ j ≤ t + 1, (28)







, 0 ≤ t ≤ T, 1 ≤ j ≤ t + 1. (29)
Proof of Proposition 1. See the Appendix.
Before analyzing the optimal share holdings xt,j,w en o t es o m ef e a t u r e so ft h eo p t i m a l
date T wealth allocations WT,j in (26) and (27). We ﬁnd that the investor’s optimal policy is
either to choose an allocation equal to the reference wealth level W0RT
f in all date T nodes,
as in (27); or, as in (26), to use a “threshold” strategy, in which, for some k∗ :1≤ k∗ ≤ T,
she allocates a wealth level greater than the reference level W0RT
f to the k∗ date T nodes
with the lowest state price densities – in other words, the k∗ date T nodes with the highest
risky asset prices – and a wealth level of zero to the remaining date T nodes. To ﬁnd the
best threshold strategy, equation (25) maximizes the investor’s utility across the T possible
values of k∗. If the best threshold strategy oﬀers negative utility, V ∗ < 0, which occurs when
the expected risky asset return is low, the investor does not use a threshold strategy, and
instead chooses a wealth level of W0RT
f in all ﬁnal date nodes; otherwise, she adopts the best
threshold strategy.
13We now illustrate the proposition with a speciﬁc example. We set the initial price of
the risky asset to P0 = 40, the investor’s initial wealth to W0 = 40, the gross risk-free rate
to Rf =1 ,t h en u m b e ro fp e r i o d st oT = 4, and the preference parameters to (α,λ)=
(0.88,2.25), the values estimated by Tversky and Kahneman (1992) from experimental data.
We also need to assign values to Ru and Rd. To do this, we take the interval from t =0
to t = T to be a ﬁxed length of time: a year, say. We choose plausible values for the annual
gross expected return µ and standard deviation σ of the risky asset and then, for any T,
back out the implied values of Ru and Rd.F o rπ =
1
2, Ru and Rd are related to µ and σ by
































In our example, we set (µ,σ)=( 1 .1,0.3), which, from (31)-(32), corresponds to (Ru,R d)=
(1.16,0.89).
For these parameter values, the top-left panel in Table 1 shows the binomial tree for the
price of the risky asset. The top-right panel reports the state price density at each node in
the tree, computed using equations (23) and (24). The bottom-left and bottom-right panels
report optimal share holdings and optimal wealth allocations at each node, respectively.
The right-most column in the bottom-right panel illustrates one of the results in the
proposition: the wealth allocation at the ﬁnal date is either zero or a positive amount that
exceeds the reference wealth level of $40. Meanwhile, the optimal share holdings in the
bottom-left panel provide an early hint of the results to come. If anything, the investor
tends to take more risk after a gain in the stock than after a loss; this behavior is the
opposite of the disposition eﬀect.
We now investigate more carefully whether prospect theory predicts a disposition eﬀect.
In brief, we use Proposition 1 to simulate an artiﬁcial dataset of how prospect theory investors
would trade over time. We mimic, as much as possible, the structure of Odean’s (1998)
actual dataset. We then apply Odean’s (1998) methodology to see if, in our simulated data,
investors exhibit a disposition eﬀect.
Odean’s (1998) data cover 10,000 accounts. We therefore generate trading data for 10,000
investors with prospect theory preferences, each of whom holds NS stocks. For each investor,
we use the binomial distribution in (9) to simulate a T-period stock price path for each of
her NS stocks. We assume that all stocks have the same annual expected return µ and
14standard deviation σ, and that each one is distributed independently of the others. Given
return process parameters, preference parameters, and the 10,000×NS simulated stock price
paths, we can use Proposition 1 to construct a dataset of how the 10,000 prospect theory
investors trade each of their NS stocks over T periods. For example, if one of an investor’s
stocks follows the
40 → 46.5 → 54.0 → 47.9 → 42.4
price path through the binomial tree in Table 1, we know that the investor will trade the
stock so as to allocate 1.7, 1.8, 3.5, and 0.5 shares at each trading date.
To see if there is a disposition eﬀect in our artiﬁcial data, we follow the method of Odean
(1998), described in Section 2. For each investor, we look at each of the T −1 trading dates,
t =1 ,...,T− 1. If the investor sells shares in any of her stocks at date t {1,...,T− 1},
we count a “realized gain” if the stock price exceeds the average price at which shares were
purchased, and a “realized loss” otherwise. For every stock in the investor’s portfolio at date
t that is not sold, we count a “paper gain” if the stock price exceeds the average price at
which shares were purchased, and a “paper loss” otherwise. We count up the total number of
paper gains and losses and realized gains and losses across all investors, and compute PGR
and PLR, ﬁrst deﬁned in equations (3)-(4):
PGR =
no. of realized gains
no. of realized gains + no. of paper gains
(33)
PLR =
no. of realized losses
no. of realized losses + no. of paper losses
. (34)
We say, as does Odean (1998), that there is a disposition eﬀect if PGR > PLR.
To implement this analysis, we ﬁx the values of P0, W0, Rf, σ, α, λ,a n dNS, and consider
a range of values for µ and T. Speciﬁcally, we set the initial price of each stock to P0 = 40,
the initial wealth allocated to trading each stock by each investor to W0 = 40, the gross
risk-free rate to Rf = 1, the annual standard deviation of each stock to σ =0 .3, and the
preference parameters for each investor to (α,λ)=( 0 .88,2.25). Odean (1998) does not
report the mean number of stocks held by households in his sample, but Barber and Odean
(2000), who use very similar data, report a mean value slightly above 4. We therefore set
NS = 4. Our results are relatively insensitive to the value of NS.
Table 2 reports PGR and PLR for various values of µ and T:g i v e nav a l u ef o rµ,av a l u e
for T, and the other parameter values from the previous paragraph, we simulate an artiﬁcial
dataset and use Odean’s (1998) methodology to compute PGR and PLR. The boldface type
identiﬁes cases where PGR is less than PLR; in words, cases where the disposition eﬀect fails.
Since the investors are loss averse, they do not buy any stock at time 0 if the expected stock
return is too low; these cases are indicated by hyphens. The table shows that the threshold
expected return at which investors buy the risky asset falls as the number of trading periods
T rises. When there are many trading periods, the kink in the utility function at time T
15is smoothed out, lowering investors’ initial risk aversion, and increasing their willingness to
buy the risky asset.
The table illustrates the main results of the paper. First, we see that, in many cases,
our simple implementation of prospect theory does predict a disposition eﬀect: PGR often
exceeds PLR. As such, our model oﬀers a formalization of the informal arguments that have
been used to link prospect theory and the disposition eﬀect.
Our second result is more surprising. We ﬁnd that, in many cases, PGR is lower than
PLR. Put diﬀerently, prospect theory often predicts the opposite of the disposition eﬀect,
namely that investors prefer to sell a stock trading at a paper loss than one trading at a
paper gain. Moreover, the table shows us when the disposition eﬀect is more likely to fail:
when the expected risky asset return is high, and when the number of trading periods T is
low. For example, when T = 2, the disposition eﬀect always fails, while for T = 12, it fails
in about half the cases we report. In the next section, we try to understand what is driving
these results.8
3.2 A dynamic programming approach
The Cox-Huang (1989) approach of Section 3.1 is very powerful: for any number of trading
periods, it provides an analytical solution for optimal wealth allocations and share holdings.
Its one drawback is that it oﬀers little intuition for why the results turn out the way they
do: Why, in many cases, does the disposition eﬀect fail? Why does it tend to fail when
the expected risky asset return is high or when the number of trading periods is low? To
address these questions, we turn to an alternative method for solving problem (13)-(15),
namely dynamic programming. This approach complements the Cox-Huang (1989) method.
While it does not lead to an analytical solution and is not computationally tractable when
the number of trading periods is large, it oﬀers much more intuition.
Since our goal in this section is to provide intuition, we keep things simple by setting
T = 2, so that there are just three dates, t =0 ,1, and 2, and two allocation decisions, at
t =0a n dt = 1. The two-period case is especially instructive because, as shown in Table 2,
the disposition eﬀect always fails in this case, at least for the preference parameters estimated
by Tversky and Kahneman (1992). We also set the gross risk-free rate to Rf =1 .
8It is hard to know which values of µ and T are most reasonable. We therefore present results for a
range of values. For some readers, the most reasonable values of µ and T may be those corresponding to
the top-right part of the table, where the disposition eﬀect does hold. Even for these readers, however, there
is an important conceptual point to take away from the table, a point which has not been noted in the
literature to date: that, for some parameters, prospect theory can predict the opposite of the disposition
eﬀect.
16With these simpliﬁcations, the decision problem (13)-(15) becomes
max
x0,x1 E[v(∆W2)] = E[v(W2 − W0)] = E [v(x0P0(R0,1 − 1) + x1P1(R1,2 − 1))] (35)
subject to W2 ≥ 0,
where the expression for W2 − W0 comes from combining the budget constraints
W1 = W0 + x0P0(R0,1 − 1),W 2 = W1 + x1P1(R1,2 − 1). (36)
In the dynamic programming approach, we ﬁrst solve the time 1 decision problem, and
then work backwards to ﬁnd the optimal share holdings at time 0. At time 1, the quantity
x0P0(R0,1−1) in (35) is known, and is therefore a state variable for the time 1 value function.
Since
x0P0(R0,1 − 1) = W1 − W0 ≡ ∆W1, (37)
we see that x0P0(R0,1 − 1) is the investor’s gain or loss from trading between time 0 and
time 1, and refer to it as the time 1 gain/loss, ∆W1.A tt i m et = 1, then, the investor solves
J(∆W1) ≡ max
x1 E[v(∆W1 + x1P1(R1,2 − 1))] (38)
subject to W2 ≥ 0,
and at time t =0 ,s o l v e s
max
x0 E[J(x0P0(R0,1 − 1))]
subject to W1 ≥ 0. (39)
In the two-period setting of this section, we say that there is a disposition eﬀect if and
only if
x1,1 <x 0,1 ≤ x 1,2, (40)
where, as in Section 3.1, xt,j is share holdings in the j’th node from the top at date t in the
binomial tree that describes the evolution of the stock price. In words, condition (40) says
that there is a disposition eﬀect if the investor sells shares after a time 1 gain (x1,1 <x 0,1)
and buys shares or maintains the same position after a time 1 loss (x0,1 ≤ x1,2), so that the
relative propensity to sell shares is greater after a gain.
Condition (40) is consistent with the deﬁnition of the disposition eﬀect in Section 3.1 and
in Odean (1998), namely that PGR > PLR. For example, if we have data on the trading
activity of a large number of investors, each of whom trades one stock for two periods, say,
and we compute PGR and PLR using Odean’s (1998) methodology, then it is straightforward
to see that
PGR > PLR if x1,1 <x 0,1 ≤ x1,2
PGR < PLR if x1,2 <x 0,1 ≤ x1,1
PGR = PLR otherwise.
17Condition (40) is therefore a natural deﬁnition of the disposition eﬀect in a two-period
setting.9
In Table 2, we saw that, in a two-period setting (T = 2), and for the preference param-
eterization estimated by Tversky and Kahneman (1992), our implementation of prospect
theory always predicts the opposite of the disposition eﬀect. We now quickly check that this
result remains true when we use the deﬁnition of the disposition eﬀect in condition (40).
Speciﬁcally, we solve problems (38) and (39) for various parameter values and check
whether condition (40) is satisﬁed. We set (P0,W 0)=( 4 0 ,40), σ =0 .3, (α,λ)=( 0 .88,2.25),
and consider several values of µ, the annual gross expected return on the risky asset. For
each µ, Table 3 reports optimal share holdings at time 0, x0,1, time 1 share holdings after a
gain, x1,1, and time 1 share holdings after a loss, x1,2. The table conﬁrms the results in the
“T = 2” column of Table 2. When the expected risky asset return is below 1.1, loss aversion
prevents the investor from buying any stock at all; for higher values of the expected return –
in other words, for values where we can check for a disposition eﬀect – the disposition eﬀect
always fails: the investor always sells after a loss and buys after a gain, so that condition
(40) is violated.
To understand why the disposition eﬀect fails in the two-period case, we ﬁrst study the
time 1 share holdings that solve problem (38), x1(∆W1). Indeed, the reason why the dynamic
programming approach oﬀers more intuition than the Cox-Huang (1989) approach is that
the former tells us the optimal time 1 share holdings for any time 1 gain/loss ∆W1, while the
latter only tells us the time 1 share holdings that correspond to one speciﬁc time 1 gain/loss,
namely the optimal one.
Proposition 2. The investor’s time 1 share holdings x1(∆W1) depend on the parameter
g =( Ru − 1)/(1 − Rd). (41)
• When 0 <g<λ
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9Initially, it may seem that x1,1 <x 1,2 is also a reasonable deﬁnition of the disposition eﬀect in a two-
period setting: the investor holds less of the stock after a gain than after a loss. However, this condition
is not consistent with Odean’s (1998) deﬁnition, that PGR > PLR. If x1,1 <x 1,2 <x 0,1, for example, the
investor realizes both gains and losses, so that PGR = PLR. And if x0,1 ≤ x1,1 <x 1,2, the investor realizes


















































∆W1 ≤ ∆W ∗
∆W1 > ∆W ∗ , (45)






















Proof of Proposition 2. See the Appendix.
Equations (42) and (45) make reference to the quantity (W0 +∆W1)/(P1(1−Rd)). This
is the largest share allocation allowed by the constraint that time 2 wealth be non-negative.
To see this, note that since
W2 = W1 + x1P1(R1,2 − 1), (47)
we need x1 ≤ W1/(P1(1 − Rd)) to ensure that W2 remains non-negative even if the return





The proposition distinguishes between two cases, depending on the level of g.T o s e e
why prospect theory fails to predict a disposition eﬀect, we need to consider each case in
turn. The case of g>λ
1
α is straightforward. In this case, the expected return on the risky
asset is high. The investor ﬁnds the risky asset so attractive that, as equation (45) shows,
for much of the range of ∆W1, her allocation is limited only by the wealth constraint. After
a time 1 loss, the investor has relatively little wealth, and is forced by the wealth constraint
to take a small position in the risky asset. After a gain, she is wealthier, and, even if wealth
constrained, can take a larger position. She therefore takes more risk after a gain than after
a loss, contrary to the disposition eﬀect. This is why, for µ ≥ 1.18 in Table 3 – the range for
which g>λ
1
α – the disposition eﬀect fails.
19The more interesting case is that of g<λ
1
α. Here, the expected risky asset return is
relatively low. We assume, however, that the expected return, while low, is still somewhat
higher than the risk-free rate; as we will see in the next section, this is the only case that is
relevant to understanding whether the disposition eﬀect holds. For an expected return that
is low but not too low, then, the investor adopts the following strategy. After a gain at time
1( ∆ W1 > 0), she takes a position such that, even if the return from time 1 to time 2 is
poor, she still ends up with a gain – a small gain – at time 2.
This result can be seen both mathematically and intuitively. To see it mathematically,
look at equation (44), which, from equation (42), gives the optimal share allocation after a




is relatively large, and so x1(·) is slightly less than ∆W1
P1(1−Rd). Since the investor’s gain/loss at
time 2 is
∆W2 =∆ W1 + x1P1(R1,2 − 1),
we see that, at time 1, the investor takes a position in the risky asset such that, if the return





P1(Rd − 1) = 0; (49)
in words, a time 2 gain slightly greater than zero.
What is the intuition for this result? The concavity of the value function v(·)i nt h e
region of gains is mild – Tversky and Kahneman’s (1992) estimate of α =0 .88 implies only
mild concavity. Moreover, we are focussing on the case where the expected risky asset return,
while low, is still somewhat higher than the risk-free rate. Taken together, these two things
mean that the investor is willing to gamble at least as far as the edge of the concave region;
in other words, to take a time 1 position such that, after a poor return from time 1 to time
2, her time 2 gain is slightly greater than zero. However, she is not willing to take a larger
gamble than this: if she does, she risks ending up with a loss at time 2, which, given that
she is loss averse, would be very painful.
If the investor has a loss at time 1 (∆W1 < 0), she will, at most, take a position such
that, if the return from time 1 to time 2 is good, she ends up with a time 2 gain slightly
above zero. Once again, this can be understood both mathematically and intuitively.
For a mathematical perspective, look at equation (43), which, from equation (42), is







1−α is small, and so x1(·) is slightly greater than
−∆W1
P1(Ru−1). This means
that, at time 1, the investor takes a position in the risky asset such that, if the return from




P1(Ru − 1) = 0; (50)
20in words, a time 2 gain slightly greater than zero.
The intuition for this is that, since the value function v(·) is convex in the region of
losses, the investor is happy to gamble at least as far as the edge of the convex region; in
other words, to take a time 1 position such that, after a good return from time 1 to time 2,
she ends up with a time 2 gain close to zero. However, she is not willing to take a position
much larger than this because, to the right of the kink in the value function, the potential
marginal gain is much lower relative to the potential marginal loss.
3.3 An example
We now illustrate the discussion in Section 3.2 graphically; once we have done so, it will be
easier to see why prospect theory fails to predict a disposition eﬀect in the case of g<λ
1
α.
In the example we now consider, we set (P0,W 0)=( 4 0 ,40), (µ,σ)=( 1 .1,0.3), and (α,λ)=
(0.88,2.25), which correspond to the third row of Table 3. When T = 2, this choice of µ and
σ implies (Ru,R d)=( 1 .25,0.85). For these parameters, g is indeed less than λ
1
α.
Given these parameters, we can compute the time 1 allocation function x1(∆W1)i n
equation (42), the time 1 value function J(·) in (38), and hence the time 0 allocation x0 that
solves problem (39). We ﬁnd that x0 =4 .0. Figure 2 plots the investor’s time 1 and time 2
gain/losses on her time 2 prospect theory utility function. Point A marks her potential time
1 gain, namely
∆W1 = x0P0(Ru − 1) = (4.0)(40)(0.25) = 39.9.
From equation (44), the corresponding optimal time 1 allocation is x1(39.9) = 5.05. Points
B and B’ mark the time 2 gain/losses that this time 1 allocation could lead to, namely
∆W1 + x1P1(Ru − 1) = 39.9+( 5 .05)(40)(1.25)(0.25) = 102.71, or
∆W1 + x1P1(Rd − 1) = 39.9+( 5 .05)(40)(1.25)(−0.15) = 1.63.
Similarly, Point C marks the investor’s potential time 1 loss, namely
x0P0(Rd − 1) = (4.0)(40)(−0.15) = −24.3.
From equation (42), the corresponding optimal time 1 allocation is x1(−24.3) = 3.06. Points
D and D’ mark the time 2 gain/losses that this time 1 allocation could lead to, namely10
∆W1 + x1P1(Ru − 1) = −24.3+( 3 .06)(40)(0.85)(0.25) = 1.63, or
∆W1 + x1P1(Ru − 1) = −24.3+( 3 .06)(40)(0.85)(−0.15) = −40.
10B and D’ are the same point. The proof of Proposition 1 shows that our model satisﬁes a “path
independence” property, whereby the optimal gain/loss at any date T node is independent of the path the
stock price takes through the binomial tree to reach that node. The gain/loss in the middle node at date 2
is therefore the same, whether the stock did well at date 1 and poorly at date 2, or vice-versa.
21The ﬁgure illustrates the discussion in Section 3.2. After a time 1 gain (point A), the
investor takes a position such that, after a poor return from time 1 to time 2, she ends up
with a time 2 gain slightly above zero (point B). After a time 1 loss (point C), she takes
a position such that, after a good return from time 1 to time 2, she ends up with a time 2
gain that is also slightly above zero (point D’). The time 2 gain/losses marked by D, B/D’,
and B’ satisfy the prediction of Proposition 1 that the optimal ﬁnal date wealth is either
zero or a positive quantity that exceeds the reference level. Here, the reference level is initial
wealth, W0 = 40. The −$40 loss at D therefore represents a ﬁnal wealth of zero, while B/D’
and B’, by virtue of lying to the right of the kink, represent ﬁnal wealth levels in excess of
the reference level.
In our example, the disposition eﬀect fails: the optimal time 1 allocation after a gain,
x1(39.9), is 5.05, while the optimal time 1 allocation after a loss, x1(−24.3), is 3.06. Given
that the investor starts with 4.0 shares at time 0, we see that she sells after a loss,r a t h e r
than after a gain.
Figure 2 helps us understand why the disposition eﬀect fails. For the investor to buy
the stock at all at time 0, the stock must have a reasonably high expected return, so that
Ru − 1 is somewhat larger than 1 − Rd. This means two things. First, it means that the
magnitude of the potential time 1 gain, |x0P0(Ru −1)| =3 9 .9, is larger than the magnitude
of the potential time 1 loss, |x0P0(Rd − 1)| =2 4 .3; in graphical terms, point A is further
from the vertical axis than point C is. Second, when coupled with the mild concavity of
v(·) in the region of gains, it means that the investor’s optimal strategy, after a gain, is to
gamble to the edge of the concave region; in other words, down to point B. However, it takes
a larger allocation to gamble from point A to the edge of the concave region, as the investor’s
optimal strategy says she should, than it does to gamble from point C to the edge of the
convex region, as her optimal strategy again says she should. The investor therefore takes
more risk after a gain than after a loss, contrary to the disposition eﬀect.
It is worth taking a moment to see where the traditional intuition linking prospect theory
a n dt h ed i s p o s i t i o ne ﬀ e c tc a ng o wrong. The traditional intuition says that, since the value
function v(·) is concave over gains, an investor with a time 1 gain (point A) should take a
relatively small gamble. Moreover, since the value function v(·) is convex over losses, an
investor with a time 1 loss (point C) should gamble at least to the edge of the convex region,
a relatively large gamble. The investor therefore takes less risk after a gain than after a loss.
In other words, she has a greater propensity to sell a stock after a gain than after a loss, and
the disposition eﬀect appears to hold.
The pitfall in this argument is the following. Since v(·) exhibits only mild concavity in
the region of gains, the only reason an investor would take a small position in the risky asset
after a gain is if the expected risky asset return is unattractive; in other words, if it is only
slightly higher than the risk-free rate. In such a case, however, the investor would not have
22bought the risky asset at time 0! For her to buy the risky asset in the ﬁrst place, its expected
return must be reasonably high. But this, in combination with the mild concavity of v(·)
in the region of gains, means that, after a time 1 gain, the investor takes a large gamble,
one that brings her almost to the edge of the concave region. This gamble is so large that
the disposition eﬀect fails: the investor takes more risk after a gain than after a loss, and
therefore has a greater propensity to sell prior losers than prior winners.11
This discussion also explains why, in Table 2, the disposition eﬀect does sometimes hold;
speciﬁcally, when there are many trading periods T and the expected risky asset return is
low. A key step in our explanation for why, in a two-period setting, the disposition eﬀect
fails, is that, after a gain, the investor gambles to the edge of the concave region. This relies
on the fact that the expected risky asset return is quite high, which, in turn, is because
otherwise, the investor would not buy the risky asset in the ﬁrst place.
For large T, this logic can break down: when there are many trading periods before the
ﬁnal date, the kink in the time T utility function is smoothed over, lowering the investor’s
risk aversion. She is therefore willing to buy the risky asset at time 0 even if its expected
return is only slightly higher than the risk-free rate. When the expected return is this low,
the concavity of v(·) in the region of gains leads the investor to take only a small position in
the risky asset after a gain. As a result, the disposition eﬀect can hold after all.
By identifying the situations in which the disposition eﬀect does hold and the situations
in which it does not, our analysis can help empirical researchers test our particular imple-
mentation of prospect theory. For example, since the disposition eﬀect is more likely to
hold when the expected return is low, we should empirically see more of a disposition eﬀect
among stocks with characteristics associated with low average returns. And given that the
disposition eﬀect is more likely to hold for a large number of trading periods T, we should
see more of a disposition eﬀect among traders who have a high T in mind when they buy
stocks. Such traders could be identiﬁed, for example, by the high frequency of their trading.
4 Discussion
4.1 Robustness
In Sections 3.2 and 3.3, we found that, in a two-period setting, our implementation of
prospect theory predicts the opposite of the disposition eﬀect. How sensitive is this conclusion
11The intuition that the investor gambles to the edge of the concave region after a gain, or to the edge of
the convex region after a loss, is appropriate when the return on the risky asset has a binomial distribution.
In Section 4.1, we discuss the robustness of our results to the use of a log-normal distribution.
23to our modeling assumptions?
In our explanation for why the disposition eﬀect fails, the ﬁrst step was to note that,
since the expected return on the stock must be high for the investor to buy it at all, the
potential time 1 gain exceeds the potential time 1 loss in magnitude. This step is valid
under our maintained assumption that π = 1
2; in words, our assumption that a good stock
return and a poor stock return are equally likely. If π>1
2, however, a stock can have a high
expected return by oﬀering a small gain with high probability and a large loss with small
probability. In this case, the investor is happy to buy the stock at time 0 because of its high
expected return, but the potential time 1 gain is smaller in magnitude than the potential
time 1 loss. The disposition eﬀect may now hold: the allocation needed to gamble to the
edge of the concave region after a small gain is lower than the allocation needed to gamble
to the edge of the convex region after a large loss. We caution, however, that individual
stocks exhibit positive skewness in their returns, rather than the negative skewness that this
argument requires (Fama, 1976).
Throughout Section 3, we set the parameters α and λ to the values estimated by Tversky
and Kahneman (1992). Varying the degree of loss aversion λ has little eﬀect on our results.
Indeed, for the (µ,σ)=( 1 .1,0.3) parameter values assumed in Section 3.3, and for T =2
trading periods, we obtain identical optimal share allocations for any λ [1.25,2.4]. This is
surprising at ﬁrst: one might think that a lower value of λ would lead the investor to buy
more shares at time 0, and yet, she does not. The reason is that, for most parameter values,
the investor prefers her optimal gain/loss in the middle node at date 2 – point B in Figure 2
– to be slightly above zero. If, for λ below 2.25, she were to allocate more to the risky asset
at time 0, that would mean a larger potential loss at time 1. After such a time 1 loss, the
wealth constraint would prevent her from taking a position in the risky asset large enough
to ensure that, even after a good return from time 1 to time 2, she ends up with a gain at
time 2. She therefore maintains the same time 0 allocation.
When α is substantially lower than the benchmark level of 0.88, our results do change,
and we do ﬁnd a disposition eﬀect. The parameter α governs the curvature of the value
function v(·), both in the region of gains and in the region of losses. Lowering α increases
concavity over gains and convexity over losses. Since, for lower α, the concavity over gains
is higher, the investor takes a smaller position than before after a time 1 gain; she no longer
gambles all the way to the edge of the concave region. Since the convexity over losses is
now also higher, the investor takes a larger position than before after a time 1 loss. Once α
falls suﬃciently – in the case of (µ,σ)=( 1 .1,0.3) and T =2 ,o n c eα falls below 0.77 – the
investor holds more shares after a loss than after a gain, and we obtain a disposition eﬀect.
Figure 3, which has the same form as Figure 2, illustrates this result for α =0 .65. After a
time 1 loss, the investor takes a large position in the stock in order to gamble all the way to
D’. After a time 1 gain, however, she doesn’t need to take a very large position to gamble
24down to B.
The model of Section 3 assumes that, once the investor has decided, at time 0, on the
maximum amount W0 she is willing to lose from trading the risky asset, she sticks to that
decision. In results not reported here, we ﬁnd that relaxing this assumption does not aﬀect
our conclusions. Speciﬁcally, suppose that, at time 1, the investor decides that she is willing
to lose more than just the initial W0, and that this decision is not anticipated at time 0.
Since the wealth constraint no longer binds, the investor’s allocation after a loss is given
by the term before the comma in the “∆W1 < 0” row of equation (42); in words, by the
allocation that allows her to gamble to the edge of the convex region. The argument then
proceeds as before: since the time 1 gain is larger in magnitude than the time 1 loss, it takes
a larger position to gamble to the edge of the concave region than it does to gamble to the
edge of the convex region. The disposition eﬀect again fails to hold.
In our model, the expected stock return is constant over time. If instead, after a ﬁrst-
period gain, the investor for some reason lowers her estimate of the stock’s expected return,
she will be more inclined to sell, and we may see a disposition eﬀect after all.
We note two things about this argument. First, it requires that beliefs change in a way
that cannot be considered rational: Odean (1998) ﬁnds that the average return of prior
winners is high, not low, after they are sold. Second, and more important, if we are willing
to assume that, after a gain, the investor lowers her estimate of the stock’s expected return,
then standard power utility preferences will deliver a disposition eﬀect: we do not need to
appeal to prospect theory at all! The goal of this paper is to examine the long-held view that
prospect theory generates a disposition eﬀect without auxiliary assumptions about changing
beliefs. The analysis in Section 3 shows that this view can be formalized in some cases, but
not in others.
Finally, for the sake of analytical tractability, our model assigns the risky asset return
a binomial distribution, rather than a log-normal one. However, as T →∞ , the binomial
distribution converges to a log-normal one. When we analyze the investor’s optimal trading
strategy for large T, we ﬁnd that our basic message remains intact: the disposition eﬀect
holds in some cases – speciﬁcally, for lower values of the expected risky asset return – but
fails to hold once the expected return exceeds a certain level.
4.2 Related literature
To our knowledge, only two other papers attempt to formalize the link between prospect
theory and the disposition eﬀect. Hens and Vlcek (2005) study the portfolio problem of
an investor with prospect theory preferences. Their analysis leads them to question, as do
we, whether prospect theory predicts a disposition eﬀect. At the same time, there are big
25diﬀerences between our analysis and theirs. Hens and Vleck (2005) assume that there are
only two trading periods; that the investor acts myopically, so that, at time 0, she does
not take her time 1 decision into account; and that, each period, she invests either entirely
in T-Bills or entirely in the risky asset. In this paper, we derive the trading behavior of a
prospect theory investor in a far more general framework: one that allows for any number
of trading periods and for full intertemporal optimization, and that places no restrictions on
the set of feasible strategies; even in our two-period analysis, the investor takes her time 1
decision into account at time 0. Moreover, our ability to explore cases with many trading
periods turns out to be important: qualitatively, the results are diﬀerent for high T,i nt h a t
the disposition eﬀect tends to hold more often.
Gomes (2005) studies the two-period portfolio problem of an investor with preferences
that are related to, but diﬀerent from, prospect theory. Speciﬁcally, for losses below some
speciﬁc point, he replaces the convex section of the prospect theory value function with a
concave segment. He also sets α to 0.5, rather than to the 0.88 value estimated by Tversky
and Kahneman (1992). Under these assumptions, his model predicts a disposition eﬀect.
Our paper shows that this result is special to the speciﬁc model he considers: for unmodiﬁed
prospect theory, and for Tversky and Kahneman’s (1992) parameters, the disposition eﬀect
always fails in two periods. As with Hens and Vlcek (2005), Gomes (2005) does not explore
beyond the two-period case.
Another related paper is that of Kyle, Ou-Yang, and Xiong (2006). These authors con-
sider an investor who is endowed with a project, or indivisible asset, and who is trying to
decide when to liquidate the project. On liquidation, the investor receives prospect theory
utility deﬁned over the diﬀerence between the project’s liquidation value and the amount
invested in the project. This analysis diﬀers from ours in a number of ways: most impor-
tantly, in that it does not take into account the investor’s initial buying decision. As soon as
we do, we recognize that the expected risky asset return must exceed a certain level. This,
in turn, aﬀects the frequency with which prospect theory can predict a disposition eﬀect.
The results in Proposition 1 are related to those of Berkelaar, Kouwenberg, and Post
(2004), who, in continuous time, solve the portfolio problem of a prospect theory investor
with a horizon of T years. These authors make no mention at all of the disposition eﬀect;
rather, their focus is on how the investor’s time 0 allocation varies with the length of the
horizon T.W e u s e a discrete- t i m ef r a m e w o r kb e c a u s ew ew a n tt ob ea b l et ov a r yt h e
frequency with which the investor can change her share holdings. This, in turn, allows us to
study the way in which the link between prospect theory and the disposition eﬀect depends
on trading frequency.
264.3 Other applications
So far, we have applied our analysis to the trading of individual stocks. A number of recent
papers uncover disposition-type evidence in other settings. Is our analysis also relevant in
these other situations?
Genesove and Mayer (2001) ﬁnd that homeowners are reluctant to sell their houses at
prices below the original purchase price. They suggest that the concave-convex shape of
the prospect theory value function may explain their evidence. The analysis in Section 3
shows that this explanation needs to be treated carefully: in its simplest implementation,
prospect theory can sometimes make the opposite prediction, namely that people will be
more reluctant to sell after a gain relative to purchase price than after a loss.12
Heath, Huddart, and Lang (1999) ﬁnd that executives are more likely to exercise stock
options when the underlying stock price exceeds a reference point – speciﬁcally, the stock’s
highest price over the previous year – than when it falls below that reference point. Does
prospect theory predict these results, as the authors suggest? Not necessarily: our analysis
shows that, in some cases, a prospect theory investor takes more risk after a gain than after
a loss. However, there is an important caveat here. In our model, we know that the expected
return on the risky asset is quite high: otherwise, the investor would not buy the asset in
the ﬁrst place. Executives, however, do not hold options because of an active decision that
they made to buy them; they are simply endowed with them. Therefore, we cannot deduce,
just from the fact that they hold options, that these options have a high expected return.
If the stock options have a low expected return, prospect theory can more easily predict
the disposition-type eﬀects in Heath et al. (1999). After a gain, the executive is in the
concave region of the prospect theory value function. Even though the value function is only
mildly concave in this region, the expected return on the options may be so low that the
executive only wants to have a small position in them. After a loss, she is in the convex
region, and so long as the expected return on the options exceeds the risk-free rate, she will
at least gamble to the edge of the convex region. Overall, then, she may want to take less
risk after a gain than after a loss, and may therefore exercise more options after a gain,
consistent with Heath et al. (1999).
Our ﬁndings are also relevant to Coval and Shumway (2005), who show that futures
traders who have accumulated trading proﬁts by the midpoint of the day take less risk in
the afternoon than traders who, by the midpoint of the day, have trading losses. Our analysis
12One diﬀerence between buying a house and buying a stock is that a homebuyer is motivated not only
by future investment performance, but also by factors such as the psychological utility of owning a home.
So long as these other factors remain relatively constant over time, the models of Section 3 can still be used
to predict propensity to sell; we simply need to adjust the risky asset’s expected return upward to capture
the positive eﬀect that the additional factors have on the asset’s desirability.
27suggests that, in its simplest implementation, prospect theory can predict these results in
some cases, but not in others. For example, we know from Section 3 that, if the expected
return on the risky asset is high – in this context, if the expected return from trading is high
– a trader will tend to take more risk after a gain than after a loss.
Recently, Grinblatt and Han (2005) and Frazzini (2006) have argued that, if a sizeable
segment of the investor population exhibits the disposition eﬀect, this could leave an imprint
on asset prices and, in particular, could generate momentum and a post-earnings announce-
ment drift in stock returns. Given that prospect theory has been closely associated with the
disposition eﬀect, Grinblatt and Han (2005) and Frazzini (2006) conjecture that, if momen-
tum is driven by the disposition eﬀect, then it may be ultimately by driven by the presence,
in the economy, of investors with prospect theory preferences.
A full analysis of this conjecture is beyond the scope of this paper. Nevertheless, the
partial equilibrium results of Section 3 suggest that, for our implementation of prospect
theory, it may not hold in all cases. As we have seen, a prospect theory investor sometimes
w a n t st ot a k el e s sr i s ka f t e raloss than after a gain. In order to clear the market, then,
expected stock returns may need to be higher after a loss than after a gain. This is the
opposite of momentum.
5C o n c l u s i o n
One of the most striking portfolio puzzles is the “disposition eﬀect”: the tendency of indi-
viduals to sell stocks in their portfolios that have risen in value since purchase, rather than
fallen in value. Perhaps the most prominent explanation for this puzzle is based on prospect
theory. Despite its prominence, this explanation has received little formal scrutiny. We take
up this task, and analyze the trading behavior of an investor with prospect theory prefer-
ences. We ﬁnd that, at least for the simplest implementation of prospect theory, the link
between these preferences and the disposition eﬀect is not as obvious as previously thought:
in some cases, prospect theory does indeed predict a disposition eﬀect; but in other cases, it
predicts the opposite.
We are keen to emphasize that, while our particular implementation of prospect theory
does not always produce a disposition eﬀect, it does do so in many cases. As such, it may turn
out to be the right way of thinking about this particular pattern of trading. To determine
this, future research could test some of the new predictions, discussed in Section 3, that
come out of our model.
If the predictions of our model are not borne out in the data, we can turn our attention
to other models, including, for example, alternative implementations of prospect theory. We
28mentioned one such alternative in Section 2: a model in which the investor receives prospect
theory utility from realized gains and losses. While preferences deﬁned over realized gains
and losses represent a signiﬁcant departure from standard models, our analysis suggests that
we may need this kind of structure in order to fully understand the disposition eﬀect.
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317 Appendix
7.1 Proof of Proposition 1.
To prove the proposition, we use the insight of Cox and Huang (1989) that, when markets are
complete, an investor’s dynamic optimization problem can be rewritten as a static problem in
which the investor directly allocates wealth across ﬁnal period states. When the investor’s utility
function is concave, the ﬁnal period wealth allocation is not path-dependent: the optimal wealth
allocation to node j at time T does not depend on the path the stock price takes through the
binomial tree before arriving at that node.
In our case, however, the investor has a prospect theory utility function, which is not concave.
Her ﬁnal period wealth allocation could therefore be path dependent. To accommodate this possi-
bility, we allow the investor to allocate wealth across stock price paths. As part of the proof of the
proposition, we show that, in fact, her optimal wealth allocation is not path dependent.
There are M =2 T paths that the stock price can take to reach one of the date T nodes. We
denote these paths by i ∈{ 1,2,···,M}. The ex-ante probability of path i is   πi,s ot h a t
M  
i=1
  πi =1 .
The price of a contingent claim that pays $1 at time T if the stock price evolves along path i is   pi.
The state price density at the endpoint of the path is therefore




In addition, W0 is the investor’s initial wealth at time 0, Rf is the per-period gross risk-free rate,
and {  Wi}M
i=1 are the investor’s wealth allocations at the end of each path. Hats indicate variables
that are indexed by path, rather than by node. While the optimal date T wealth allocations may
be path dependent, the state price densities are not: if paths i and j end at the same date T node,
then   qi=  qj. We compute the state price density explicitly later in the proof.
Applying the reasoning of Cox and Huang (1989), we can rewrite problem (13)-(15) as




  πiv(  Wi − W0RT
f ), (51)
subject to the budget constraint
M  
i=1
  πi  qi  Wi = W0 (52)
and the non-negativity of wealth constraint
  Wi ≥ 0, 1 ≤ i ≤ M. (53)
We write the reference wealth level W0RT
f as W, for short, and deﬁne
  wi =   Wi − W
32to be the investor’s gain/loss relative to that reference level. The problem in (51)-(53) then becomes








  πi  qi   wi = 0 (55)
  wi ≥− W,1 ≤ i ≤ M. (56)
We now prove the proposition through a series of lemmas.
Lemma 1. There exists at least one optimum.
Proof of Lemma 1. The set of feasible {   wi}, deﬁned by constraints (55)-(56), is compact. The
existence result then follows directly from Weierstrass’ theorem.♦
We now describe some of the properties of the optimum. Without loss of generality, we assume
  π1−α
1   q−α
1 ≤   π1−α
2   q−α
2 ≤···≤  π1−α
M   q−α
M .
Lemma 2. If   π1−α
M   q−α
M >λ   π1−α
1   q−α
1 , {   wi =0 }M
i=1 cannot be the optimum.
P r o o fo fL e m m a2 . We prove the lemma by contradiction. Suppose that {   wi =0 }M
i=1 is the
optimum, so that the investor’s value function takes the value V = 0. Consider the strategy
  w1 = −x,   w2 = ···=   wM−1 =0 ,   wM =
  π1  q1
  πM   qM
x,
where x ∈ [0,W]. By construction, this strategy satisﬁes the budget constraint. The associated
value function is
V   =   πM
  πα
1   qα
1
  πα
M   qα
M




M   q−α
M
  π1−α




  π1xα >V =0 .
Thus, we obtain a contradiction; {   wi =0 }M
i=1 cannot be the optimum.♦
Lemma 3. If the investor’s optimal gain/loss   wi is diﬀerent from zero at the end of some path,
then it is diﬀerent from zero at the end of all paths.
Proof of Lemma 3. We prove the lemma by contradiction. Suppose that the investor’s gain/loss
is zero at the end of path i,s ot h a t   wi = 0. If the investor’s gain/loss is negative at the end of
one path, it must be positive at the end of another path. We therefore assume, without any loss of
33generality, that the investor’s gain/loss is positive at the end of path j,s ot h a t   wj = x>0. The
contribution of paths i and j to total utility is
J =   πjxα.
We now modify this strategy by moving a small amount of wealth δ>0f r o mp a t hj to path i,s o
that
  wi = δ,   wj = x −
  πi  qi
  πj  qj
δ.
The contribution of paths i and j to total utility is now
J(δ)=  πiδα +   πj
 
x −
  πi  qi




It is straightforward to verify that
J (0) > 0,
so that moving wealth from path j to path i increases the investor’s value function. This contradicts
the initial assumption that   wi = 0 is optimal. Hence, the optimal gain/loss is diﬀerent from zero
at the end of all paths.♦
Lemma 4. If the optimal allocation is non-zero, there must be at least one path at the end of
which the gain/loss is −W, so that the investor is wealth constrained.
P r o o fo fL e m m a4 .Suppose that   w =(  w1,   w2,···,   wM) is a non-zero optimal allocation, so that
the value function J(  w) >J (0) = 0. Suppose also that the wealth constraint is never binding, so
that   wi > −W, ∀i. This implies that there exists k>1 such that k  w is a feasible allocation, which,
in turn, means that J(k  w)=kαJ(  w) >J(  w). Thus, we have a contradiction.♦
In any non-trivial optimum – any optimum in which   wi does not equal 0 for all i – there are three
possible wealth allocations at the end of a path: a positive allocation (   wi > 0), an unconstrained
negative allocation (−W<  wi < 0), or a constrained negative allocation (   wi = −W). In particular,
from Lemma 3, we know that   wi = 0 cannot be an optimal allocation.




  πiv(   wi) − µ0
M  
i=1
  πi  qi   wi +
M  
i=1
µi(   wi + W),
where µ0 > 0 is the multiplier associated with the budget constraint, and µi ≥ 0 is the multiplier
associated with the wealth constraint on path i. The ﬁrst-order condition for   wi is
v (   wi)=µ0  qi − µi/  πi, 1 ≤ i ≤ M.
Since µi is associated with an inequality constraint,
µi =0 i f   wi > −W, 1 ≤ i ≤ M,
and
µi > 0i f   wi = −W, 1 ≤ i ≤ M.
34Since v (·) ranges from zero to inﬁnity in both the negative and positive domains, there are
three possible solutions to the ﬁrst-order condition:
1. A positive wealth allocation:







2. An unconstrained negative wealth allocation:











3. A constrained negative wealth allocation:





For any solution to the ﬁrst-order condition, we sort the M paths based on their respective
wealth allocations: paths {1,···,k} have a positive allocation, paths {k +1 ,···,m} have an un-
constrained negative allocation, and paths {m+1,···,M} have a constrained negative allocation.
The multiplier µ0 can be determined from the budget constraint:
k  
i=1
  πi  qi   wi +
m  
j=k+1
  πj  qj   wj =
M  
l=m+1
  πl  qlW.
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The optimal date T wealth allocation is determined by comparing all possible solutions. Such a
comparison reveals several additional properties of the optimal allocation.
Lemma 5. It is not optimal to have a path with an unconstrained negative allocation,   wi : −W<
  wi < 0.
35Proof of Lemma 5. From equation (61), we see that replacing an unconstrained negative wealth
allocation with a positive wealth allocation strictly improves the value function. Thus, it is not
optimal to have a path with an unconstrained negative allocation.♦
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Lemma 6. Suppose that, in each period, a good stock return and a poor stock return are equally
likely. In this case, any path with a constrained negative wealth allocation must have a state price
density not lower than that of any path with a positive allocation.
P r o o fo fL e m m a6 .Given the equal probability of a good or poor return, each price path has
the same probability:
  πi =
1
2T ,i =1 ,···,M.



















− λ(M − k)
⎤
⎦. (63)
Suppose that   ql <   qi for some i ∈{ 1,···,k} and l ∈{ k +1 ,...,M}. Equation (63) shows
that assigning path l a positive wealth allocation and path i a constrained negative allocation −W
strictly improves the value function. Thus, we obtain a contradiction. Any path with a constrained
negative allocation must therefore have a state price density not lower than that of any path with
a positive allocation.♦
Lemma 6 shows that the optimal wealth allocation has a threshold property: paths with a state
price density higher than a certain level have a constrained negative allocation, while paths with a
state price density lower than that level have a positive allocation. This threshold property may
not hold if the probabilities of a good or poor return are not the same.
Another corollary of Lemma 6 is that the ﬁnal date wealth allocations can be path dependent
at, at most, one node. If they were path dependent at more than one node, we could ﬁnd a path
with a constrained negative wealth allocation that had a state price density lower than that of a
path with a positive wealth allocation. This would contradict the lemma.
We now show that the ﬁnal date wealth allocation cannot be path dependent at any ﬁnal date
node. We demonstrate this by showing that, if this is not true, then it is impossible to clear markets
in an equilibrium model with both prospect theory agents and standard power utility agents.
Consider a Lucas exchange economy with T +1dates, t =0 ,1,...,T. There is a risky asset,
which is a claim to a time T dividend of D0G1 ...G T. D0 is known at time 0, while Gt is announced
at time t. Gt is independently distributed for each t, and takes the value Du > 1 with probability
1
2 and Dd < 1 with probability 1
2. News about the ﬁnal dividend therefore evolves along a binomial
tree.
36There are two groups of investors: investors in the ﬁrst group have the prospect theory objective
function in (19); investors in the second group have a power utility function Cγ deﬁned over ﬁnal
consumption. At date 0, the prospect theory investors hold a fraction κ of the initial endowment
of the risky asset, and power utility investors hold the rest. We assume, as before, that markets
are complete.
We denote prospect theory investors’ optimal date T consumption at the end of path i as C
p
i .
As discussed above, this consumption allocation depends on the path’s state price density. We
denote power utility investors’ optimal date T consumption at the end of path i as Cn
i . A well-
known property of power utility investors’ optimal consumption is that it is strictly decreasing in
a path’s state price density.
Lemma 7. If paths i and j end at the same ﬁnal date node, so that they have the same ﬁnal date
dividend, then they will have the same state price density and prospect theory investors will assign
identical wealth allocations to the two paths.
Proof of Lemma 7. Suppose that prospect theory investors assign diﬀerent wealth allocations to
paths i and j. From our earlier discussion, one of the paths must have a constrained allocation of
0, while the other must have an allocation higher than W. Without loss of generality, we let path
i have the positive allocation and path j the zero allocation. Lemma 6 then implies   qi ≤   qj.
Market clearing implies that Cn
i <C n
j . The optimization problem for the power utility investors
then implies   qi >   qj. This gives a contradiction. Thus, the prospect theory investors must have the
same wealth allocation for paths i and j. Market clearing means that the power utility investors
also have the same wealth allocation for paths i and j. This implies that   qi=  qj.♦
We have used a simple equilibrium argument to show that the wealth allocation at any date T
node does not depend on the path by which the stock price arrives at that node. We can therefore
revert to the notation of Section 3, where Pt,j, Wt,i, xt,i,a n dqt,i denote the stock price, optimal
wealth allocation, optimal share holding, and state price density in node i at date t.
The ﬁnal ingredient we need to complete the proof is the state price density qt,i. Since the price
process for the risky asset is homogeneous, the state price process qt,i must also be homogeneous.
We therefore assume that, each period, qt,i either goes up by qu or goes down by qd. A standard







which is equivalent to
1
2
(quRu + qdRd)=1 .
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Since (1 − Rd) < (Ru − 1), we have qu <q d.
We can now complete the proof. From (64), we know that the state price density increases as
we go down the T +1d a t eT nodes:
qT,1 <q T,2 <...<q T,T+1.
From Lemma 6, equation (57), and equation (60), and remembering that we are now summing over
nodes, not paths, we know that, for the k∗ top nodes in the ﬁnal period, where 1 ≤ k∗ ≤ T,t h e



















where πT,l is the probability of reaching node l on date T:
πT,l =
T!2−T
(T − l +1 ) ! ( l − 1)!
;
and for the bottom T +1− k∗ nodes, she chooses an optimal wealth allocation of zero.
To determine k∗, we need to compute the investor’s utility for each of the T possible values of
k∗,1≤ k ≤ T, and to ﬁnd the wealth allocation strategy that maximizes utility. Suppose that


























k∗ is the value of k that maximizes this utility.
Given the optimal wealth allocations in the ﬁnal period, WT,j, we can compute optimal wealth
allocations at all earlier dates using the state price density, as shown in equation (23).
The ﬁnal step is to compute optimal share holdings at each node. Suppose that, in node i at
date t, the investor holds xt,i shares of stocks and B dollars of bonds. Her wealth at node (t+1,i)
will therefore be xt,iPt+1,i + BRf, and at node (t +1 ,i+1 ) ,xt,iPt+1.i+1 + BRf. The diﬀerence












which is equation (28). This completes the proof of the proposition.
387.2 Proof of Proposition 2.
Since the net risk-free rate is zero and the risky asset has a positive expected return (Ru−1 > 1−Rd),
the investor will only take a long position in the risky asset. Her gain/loss at time 2 is
∆W2 =∆ W1 + z1(R1,2 − 1),
where z1 = x1P1 is the dollar amount she allocates to the risky asset at time 1. The investor is
subject to a wealth constraint: her wealth cannot fall below zero after a poor return from time 1
to time 2, which means
W2 = W1 + z1(Rd − 1)





We analyze the investor’s portfolio choice at time 1 depending on whether she has a positive, zero,
or negative gain/loss at that time.
Case A: ∆W1 < 0. In this case, the investor will always have a loss after a negative shock at time
2. However, after a positive shock, she could have either a gain or a loss, depending on the size of
z1. We consider two scenarios.
Scenario I: The investor takes a position small enough so that ∆W2 is always negative (z1 <
−∆W1
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(Ru − 1)[−∆W1 − (Ru − 1)z1]−(1−α) −
αλ
2
(1 − Rd)[−∆W1 +( 1− Rd)z1]−(1−α),
so that
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L1(z1) is therefore monotonically increasing in this region.
Scenario II: The investor takes a large enough position at time 1 so that ∆W 2 is positive after
a positive shock at time 2 (z1 > −∆W1
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> 0. When g>λ
1
α,w h e r eg is deﬁned in (41), L 
1(z1)=0
does not have a solution in the range (
−∆W1
Ru−1 ,∞). L1(z1) is therefore monotonically increasing for





α, there is a unique solution z∗ to L 
1(z1)=0f o rz1 > −∆W1



























Case B: ∆W1 =0 . In this case, the investor will always have a gain after a positive time 2 shock




[(Ru − 1)α − λ(1 − Rd)α]zα
1 , ∀ z1 > 0.
The investor therefore takes a zero position if g<λ 1/α; otherwise, she takes the largest position
allowed by the wealth constraint, z1 = W0
1−Rd.
Case C: ∆W1 > 0. In this case, the investor will always have a gain after a positive shock at time
2. However, after a negative shock, she could have either a gain or a loss, depending on the size of
z1.
Scenario I: The investor takes a position small enough so that ∆W2 is always positive, (z1 <
∆W1




[∆W1 +( Ru − 1)z1]α +
1
2












(Ru − 1)[∆W1 +( Ru − 1)z1]−(1−α) −
α
2
(1 − Rd)[∆W1 − (1 − Rd)z1]−(1−α).
It is easy to verify that L 













































40Scenario II: The investor takes a large enough position so that ∆W2 is negative after a negative
shock at time 2 (z1 > ∆W1




[∆W1 +( Ru − 1)z1]α −
λ
2
























3(z1) starts with a negative value at ∆W1
1−Rd.W h e ng<λ
1
α, L 
3(z1)=0does not have a solution in
the range ( ∆W 1
1−Rd,∞). L3(z1) is therefore monotonically decreasing in this range, and the investor’s
optimal position is given by z∗∗.W h e ng>λ
1
α, L 
3(z1) starts out negative in the range (
∆W1
1−Rd,∞),
but eventually turns positive as z1 becomes large. Thus, it is possible that L3(z1)i nt h i sr e g i o n
can become higher than L3(z∗∗). If this occurs, the investor takes the largest position allowed by
the wealth constraint, z1 = W0+∆W1











































the investor takes the maximum position allowed by the wealth constraint, and otherwise takes a
position z∗∗. It is straightforward to check that h(0) > 0,t h a th(·) is monotonically decreasing
for ∆W 1> 0,a n dt h a th(∆W 1)=0has a unique positive solution ∆W 1=∆ W
∗.T h ei n v e s t o r
therefore takes a position z∗∗ for ∆W 1> ∆W
∗, and otherwise takes the maximum position allowed
by the wealth constraint.
41Table 1: We solve a portfolio problem with a risk-free asset and a risky asset, and
ﬁve dates, t =0 ,...,4. The investor has prospect theory preferences deﬁned over
her accumulated trading proﬁt at time 4. The top-left panel shows how the risky
asset price evolvesalong a binomial tree. The top-rightpanel shows the state price
density at each node in the tree. The bottom-left and bottom-right panels report,
for each node, the optimal number of shares in the risky asset and the optimal
wealth, respectively. The net risk-free rate is zero and the annual net expected




54.0 55.6 0.68 0.66
46.5 47.9 0.83 0.80
40 41.2 42.4 1 0.97 0.94
35.5 36.5 1.18 1.14






3.5 - 64.25 46.47
1.8 0.5 50.75 42.87
1.7 0.2 - 40 41.27 40.34
1.5 0.0 32.45 40.15
2.7 - 26.26 40.02
5.2 16.51
- 0
42Table 2: For a given (µ,T) pair, we construct an artiﬁcial dataset of how 10,000
investors with prospect theory preferences, each of whom owns NS stocks, each
of which has an annual gross expected return µ, would trade those stocks over
T periods. For each (µ,T) pair, we use the artiﬁcal dataset to compute PGR
and PLR, where PGR is the proportion of gains realized by all investors over
the entire trading period, and PLR is the proportion of losses realized. The table
reports “PGR/PLR” for each (µ,T) pair. Boldface type identiﬁes cases where
the disposition effect fails (PGR < PLR). A hyphen indicates that the expected
return is so low that the investor does not buy any stock at all.
µ T =2 T =4 T =6 T =1 2
1.03 - - - .55/.50
1.04 - - .54/.52 .54/.52
1.05 - - .54/.52 .59/.45
1.06 - .70/.25 .54/.52 .58/.47
1.07 - .70/.25 .54/.52 .57/.49
1.08 - .70/.25 .48/.58 .47/.60
1.09 - .43/.70 .48/.58 .46/.61
1.10 0.0/1.0 .43/.70 .48/.58 .36/.69
1.11 0.0/1.0 .43/.70 .49/.58 .37/.68
1.12 0.0/1.0 .28/.77 .23/.81 .40/.66
1.13 0.0/1.0 .28/.77 .24/.83 .25/.78
43Table 3: We solve a two-period portfolio problem with a risk-free asset and a risky
asset. The investor has prospect theory preferences deﬁned over her accumulated
trading proﬁt at the ﬁnal date. x0,1 is the optimal share allocation at time 0; x1,1
and x1,2 are the optimal time 1 share allocations after a gain and after a loss,
respectively. µ is the annual gross expected return on the risky asset.
µ x0,1 x1,1 x1,2
1.06 0.00 0.00 0.00
1.08 0.00 0.00 0.00
1.10 4.00 5.05 3.06
1.12 4.55 6.51 2.99
1.14 5.17 8.30 2.94
1.16 5.88 10.60 2.92
1.18 6.72 13.66 2.90
1.20 7.73 17.85 2.88










The prospect theory value function
Figure 1. The graph shows the form of the prospect theory value function v(·) proposed
by Tversky and Kahneman (1992).




















Figure 2. The graph plots the gains and losses experienced by an investor with prospect
theory preferences against her ﬁnal period utility function. Point A is the potential time
1 gain and points B and B’ are the time 2 gains that her corresponding time 1 allocation
could lead to. Point C is the potential time 1 loss and points D and D’ are the time 2
gains/losses that her corresponding time 1 allocation could lead to.


















Figure 3. The graph plots the gains and losses experienced by an investor with prospect
theory preferences against her ﬁnal period utility function. Point A is the potential time
1 gain and points B and B’ are the time 2 gains that her corresponding time 1 allocation
could lead to. Point C is the potential time 1 loss and points D and D’ are the time 2
gains/losses that her corresponding time 1 allocation could lead to. The parameter α is
set to 0.65, lower than the benchmark value of 0.88, thereby increasing the concavity
(convexity) of the utility function in the region of gains (losses).
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